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Abstract
The interest in the factors involved in rising health care expenditure has created a
third generation industry which is exploring data and econometric issues (see
Gerdtham and Jönsson, 2000). However a common element missing from
research, even in Gerdtham and Jönsson’s agenda, is a consideration of the
regional composition within the national health expenditure figures. An
aggregation fallacy in estimating the income elasticity of health expenditure may
therefore result from it.
In order to study this, we have applied a multilevel hierarchical model using data
for 110 regions in eight OECD countries in 1997: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. In doing this we have tried
to identify two sources of random variation: within countries and between-
countries.  The basic purpose is to find out if the different relationships between
health care spending and the explanatory variables are country-specific. Our
results show that: 1- Variability between countries amounts to (SD) 0.5433, and
just 13% of that can be attributed to income elasticity and the remaining 87% to
autonomous health expenditure; 2- Within countries, variability amounts to (SD)
1.0249; and 3- The intra-class correlation is 0.5300. We conclude that we have to
take into account the degree of fiscal decentralisation within countries in
estimating income elasticity of health expenditure. Two reasons lie behind this: a)
where there is decentralisation to the regions, policies aimed at emulating
diversity tend to increase national health care expenditure; and b) without fiscal
decentralisation, central monitoring of finance tends to reduce regional diversity
and therefore decrease national health expenditure.  The results do seem to
validate both these points.
Keywords: OECD health expenditure, fiscal federalism, multilevel hierarchical
models.
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1.- Introduction.
It is now almost twenty-five years since the publication of the pioneering paper by
J. Newhouse (1977) on international comparisons of health expenditure. Since
then, the interest in understanding the factors involved in for health care spending
has created a third generation industry for exploring the theory, data and
econometric analysis of the issue (see Gerdtham and Jönsson, 2000).  However a
common element missing from research (even in Gerdtham and Jönsson’s agenda)
is that of taking into account the regional composition of the national health
expenditure figures. In fact, health care in most countries is a rather ‘local good’
for which the fiscal decentralisation theory applies and heterogeneity is the result.
Indeed in most OECD countries, fiscal federalism allows some key decisions on
health spending and finance to be made by regional or local authorities. Australia,
Canada, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, etc... in one way or
another are decentralised countries with regions that have total or partial
autonomy for regional health care expenditure.  As a result, if we ignore the
‘regional factor’ in international comparisons we run the risk of incurring a kind
of aggregation fallacy. For instance, it may be not just the national average
income that may influence health care expenditure but also its regional
distribution.
In a similar way, certain other side effects of the above observation may result
from the way in which the variance in health needs has an impact on the health
care utilisation, expenditure assessment and regional finance.  Whereas in a
private system income differences and health status usually imply a larger
insurance coverage and greater health care premium on an individual basis, this is
not usually the case in public health care systems, whether of the National Health
Service type or of the Social insurance based.  Particularly when a central
assessment of the financial allocation neglects health expenditure needs.  Even if
this is not so, it may be that the group with the highest regional need or with the
highest demand (influenced by income) crucially influences the average national
level of health care provided. For instance, in Spain, with eight regions running
the health services on behalf of two thirds of the total population, regional policies5
to emulate others may exist, extending the larger benefit levels of some regions to
the rest. If these benefits have to do with income or health status (or any of the
other explanatory factors usually considered) we could predict higher than
expected health care expenditure, other things being equal, in countries such as
these.
The way in which regional differences are taken into account by health authorities
may depend on one of the following questions: 1- Is finance still under state
control?. Here the relevant factor will be the way revenues are geographically
allocated. The RAWP formula for England is a perfect example of this. Under this
scheme, however, a relative higher regional income is not accounted for positively
as a factor stimulating demand, but rather in a negative sense, as evidence of a
need for redistribution.  Italy also provides some examples for this; 2- Is health
care finance fully decentralised? The Canadian “fiscal room” (a rebate which is
first applied in the state personal and corporation income tax in order to allow
similar, lower or larger substitutive rates in favour of the provinces) is here the
example. Large local autonomy in the financial side appears in the Swedish case
too; and finally, 3- What is the nature of the constitutional powers in health care
management on a regional basis?. For example, they are very important in Spain,
Canada or Australia, but without political weight in England or France.
In conjunction with the above factors, the causes of heterogeneity become more
complex: a) dispersion in central finance of regional health care expenditure may
be greater whenever the political powers of the regions are weak and no “fiscal
room” for revenue raising exists amongst the regions (this is the case in France
and the UK. See descriptive data in Table 1); b) dispersion in central finance of
regional health care expenditure is smaller when political power of the regions are
strong but no “fiscal room” exists for the regions (this is the case in Spain,
Australia and Italy). This is due to the fact that any difference in regional finance
is politically viewed as a gap in redistribution and social cohesion; and finally, c)
with fiscal autonomy for the regions and strong political power, dispersion in
health care expenditure is again large (Germany, Canada and Sweden).6
As a result, what is usually accepted with regard to international comparisons, i.e.
that income, education and social development exert pressure for higher health
care expenditure (the positive income elasticity factor) is not accounted for in a
regional comparison. With fully centralised revenue allocation of health care
financing and/or an important redistribution finance policy in favour of less
wealthy regions this may not be the case. However, under a fiscal federalism
regime and/or a regional decentralisation framework of health services it may
prove to be very difficult to eliminate those pressures for higher regional
expenditure in some wealthy regions. If this is the case, states with regional
decentralisation should show both larger variance and higher levels of health care
expenditure than in more centralised systems.  In addition, if regional emulation
exists, higher levels of national health care spending should exist in decentralised
countries, since regions, independently of their particular development status can
take the standard of the highest benefit region
1.
Our hypotheses, to be tested in this paper, are that, first, income elasticity of
health care expenditure grows together with the relative variation in health care
expenditure and, second, relative variation depends not only on the relative
variation of income but, moreover, on the degree of regional decentralisation.
Methods
In order to get an understanding of the above process, we applied a multilevel
hierarchical model for 110 regions of 8 OECD countries in 1997: Australia (8
‘states), Canada (12 ‘provinces’), France (22 ‘provinces’ or quasi-regions),
Germany (16 ‘länders’), Italy (19 regions), Spain (8 ‘nationalities’), Sweden (8
‘health counties’) and United Kingdom (17 ‘regional health authorities’). In doing
this, we tried to identify two sources of random variation: within and between-
countries, that is, we allowed for the possibility that the different relationships
between health care spending and the explanatory variables, may be country-
specific.
                                                          
1 - Within the state, difference in prices do not appear relevant enough for further adjustment (other than those
considered in their own allocation of revenue formulas), unlike interstate comparisons, where levels of7
We estimated the relationship between health care expenditure (per capita) and
income (per capita) controlled by demographic structure and institutional
variables. Both health care expenditure and income were converted from national
currencies into purchasing power parities (PPP). The percentage of population 65
years and over was considered the proxy for demographic structure, and the public
health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure approached
institutional variables.
The relationship was assessed by means of a multilevel or a hierarchical model. In
particular, one level (the country) or, alternatively, two sources of random
variation (within-country and between-country) were considered. As we
mentioned above, the idea was that the different relationships between health care
expenditure and its explanatory variables might be country-specific. In the best
model, however, apart from autonomous health care expenditure only income
elasticity was, in fact, country-specific. Summarising, the following model was
finally estimated,
ij ij ij ij i i ij u PUB POP Y HE + + + + = 3 2 1 0 65 ) log( ) log( β β β β
where HE denotes per capita health care expenditure (in $PPP); Y is per capita
gross domestic product, GDP (in $PPP); POP65 is the percentage of population
65 years and over; and PUB the public health expenditure as a percentage of total
health expenditure. The subscript i denoted the country (i = Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and the subscript j
(j=1,2,...,ni) the region within the country.
The intercept (the autonomous health care expenditure),  0 β , and the income











                                                                                                                                                                                    
technology and PPP adjusted salaries may differ too.8
That is to say, the ‘effect’ of being the country i was to shift the mean income
elasticity, for instance, from  1 β  to  1 1 b + β .
The random variables,  )' ( 1 0 i i ν ν ν =  were assumed to be normally distributed with

















The disturbance term uij was assumed to be also normally distributed with zero
mean and independent of ν . Although we initially assumed a constant variance,
2
u σ , there were afterwards symptoms of within-country heteroskedasticity. For
this reason, and because of its flexibility, we allowed the variance to follow a










δ σ ij ij E H u Var
where, σ ,  1 δ and  2 δ were unknown parameters to be estimated, and  ij E H ˆ denoted
fitted values of a previous model where the variance was assumed to be constant.
As we mentioned above, there were two sources of variability assumed, the
between-country and the within-country variability, measured by 
2
ν σ and by 
2
u σ ,
respectively. Part of the between-country variability was attributed to the
autonomous health care expenditure (
2
0 ν σ ) and part to the income elasticity
(
2
1 ν σ ).
Models were estimated by restricted maximum likelihood (REML) (Patterson and
Thompson, 1971; Harville, 1977). All the computations were carried out in S-Plus
2000.9
Results and discussion
The pooled relationship between income (in $PPP per capita) and health care
expenditure (in $PPP per capita) is shown in Figure 1a. Although there was a
positive relationship, there was also a considerable dispersion both between and
within-countries (see Figure 1b).
The goodness-of-fit of the final model was reasonably high (R
2=0.859) and the
model passed the usual diagnostic tests, in particular of the absence of
heteroskedasticity (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000).
The estimates of the fixed effects are shown in Table 2. As we can see, all the
coefficients were statistically significant and have the expected sign. Nevertheless,
two particularities of our results with respect to previous ones are worth
mentioning here. First, not only increases in income, but also increases in the
percentages of population over 65 and of public health expenditures raises health
care expenditure. Second, although it is known that in contrast with time-series
studies, cross-section analyses commonly produce estimates of income elasticity
of less than one (see McGuire et al., 1993), income was estimated here with
dramatically inelastic (0.3003).
With respect to the random effects, between-country variability (standard
deviation = 0.5433) was lower than within-country variability (standard deviation
= 1.0249), leading to an intra-class correlation coefficient equal to 0.5300. Nearly
87% of between-country variability could be attributed to the autonomous health
care expenditure (standard deviation = 0.4703), whereas only 13% was attributed
to income (standard deviation = 0.0730).
Both pooled and country-specific income elasticity as well as within-country
variability (unweighted in all cases) are shown in Table 3. Germany (income
elasticity = 0.385), France (0.374), Canada (0.344) and Australia (0.330) have
estimated individual income elasticity higher than the pooled (i.e. the fixed effect
estimate 0.3003). In Spain (0.196) and, to a lesser extent the United Kingdom
(0.223) and Italy (0.259) income elasticity was estimated below the pooled.10
The ranking of estimated income elasticity, however, did not exactly match with
the ranking of income (Table 3). Note, in particular, the cases of Sweden and the
United Kingdom (lower income elasticity than expected) and Australia and Italy
(higher income elasticity). We believe that the explanation for this can be found in
Figure 2 (and Table 3): Higher (relative) variation in income leads to a higher
variation in health care expenditure (Figure 2a, coefficient of correlation =
0.6674) and, consequently, to a higher estimated income elasticity (Figure 2b,
coefficient of correlation = 0.6432). This could be considered as the third feature
of our paper, which is different with respect to previous literature.
To sum up, three particular aspects distinguish our paper from previous ones.
First, we have found that increases in the percentages of population over 65 and of
public health expenditures raised health care expenditures. Second, we have
estimated income with very low elasticity. Third, we have found that higher
(relative) variation in income leads to a higher variation in health care expenditure
and, consequently, to a higher estimated income elasticity. Whereas the first two
corresponded to between-country variability, the last clearly corresponded to
within-country variability. Nevertheless, the three features are connected in some
way to a source of variation of health care expenditure, usually neglected,  which
is the regional variation.
This particular source of variation could not have been captured using an
alternative statistical model rather than the one used in this paper, i.e. a fixed
effects model with dummy country-specific variables. Note that, in addition, this
model, with a fixed number of countries and regions, may have led us into the
classic incidental-parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948).11
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Table 1.- State coefficients of variation (CV), weighted by population, for regional variables
(1997 or circa)









Source: Own elaboration (*)- based on input utilisation13
Table 2. Estimation of the fixed effects.
β ˆ (s.e)
Income elasticity 0.3003 (0.0258)
Population over 65 years and
over
0.0075 (0.0001)
Public health care expenditure 0.0108 (0.0001)
Intercept 3.3071 (0.1663)
In all cases p<0.000114
Table 3. Country-specific income elasticity and (unweighted) within-country
variation.
(1) Per capita GDP ($PPP)     
(2)  Estimated income elasticity
Country Income
(1) Rank Income  elasticity
(2)  Rank Within-country   
coefficient of variation 
         Observed Residual 
         Health care  Income   
              
Australia  1380.7 5  0.3301  4  0.0775  0.1707  0.1976 
Canada  1588.0 3  0.3436  3  0.3530  0.2736  0.3784 
France  1643.9 2  0.3739  2  0.1562  0.1459  0.3580 
Germany  1903.3 1  0.3850  1  0.2792  0.3240  0.3276 
Italy  1123.5 7  0.2591  6  0.0845  0.2363  0.1582 
Spain  919.4 8  0.1956  8  0.0183 0.1207  0.1107 
Sweden  1459.9 4  0.2921  5  0.1086  0.0879  0.2499 
United Kingdom  1154.6 6  0.2230  7  0.1494  0.0843  0.4491 
              
Pooled  1425.1   0.3003    0.2779 0.2471  0.2834 
 15
Figure 1. Relationship between income (in $PPP per capita) and health
expenditure (in $PPP per capita).
a.- Pooled


























































b.- Pooled and country-specific.



































































Figure 2. Relationship between within-country variability and the estimates
of income elasticity.
a.- Observed coefficients of variation.




































































b.- Observed coefficient of variation and estimated income elasticity.
Coefficient of Variation, Health Care Expenditure
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